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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
McKEE, Circuit Judge 
 We are asked to decide if the City of Philadelphia’s 
unwritten policy of preventing announcements at mortgage 
foreclosure sheriff’s sales is unconstitutional. Pursuant to that 
policy, City employees forcibly prevented James Porter from 
publicly announcing to bidders at such a sale that he and his 
wife, Debra Porter, had an unrecorded interest in a property 
being auctioned. Porter sued, arguing that the City’s policy 
violated his First Amendment right to free speech. A jury 
agreed and awarded him $750,000 in damages and the District 
Court thereafter upheld that award. For the reasons that follow, 
we will reverse and remand with instructions to vacate the 




I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1 
 
This dispute arises from James Porter’s interest in a 
property located at 1039-55 Frankford Avenue in 
Philadelphia.2 Porter co-owned that property with a partner, 
and his wife held an unrecorded mortgage on the property to 
secure a $2.8 million promissory note.3 Shortly after Porter’s 
wife obtained her mortgage, and unbeknownst to Porter, his 
partner obtained a second mortgage on the property from 
Commerce Bank.4 That mortgage eventually went into default 
and the property was thereafter listed for sale at a regularly 
scheduled mortgage foreclosure sheriff’s sale conducted by the 
City of Philadelphia.5  
 
The Porters filed several actions regarding the 
Frankford Avenue property prior to the sheriff’s sale. A 
Pennsylvania state court awarded Debra damages for the title 
company’s failure to record her mortgage but declined to have 
it retroactively recorded.6 That ruling was not appealed and 
became final.7  After Commerce Bank successfully foreclosed 
on the property, the state court denied the Porters’ motion to 
postpone the sale based on Debra’s alleged interest in the 
 
1 We present the facts in the light most favorable to Porter 
despite the conflicting versions of events. See Mancini v. 
Northampton Cty., 836 F.3d 308, 314 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting 
In re Lemington Home for the Aged, 777 F.3d 620, 626 (3d 
Cir. 2015)). 
2 Porter v. City of Phila., 337 F. Supp. 3d 530, 536 (E.D. Pa. 
2018). 
3 Id. 
4 Porter Br. at 5.  
5 Porter, 337 F. Supp. 3d at 536. 
6  Porter v. TD Bank, N.A., No. CIV.A. 10-7243, 2012 WL 
3704817, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2012), aff’d on other 
grounds, 519 F. App’x 109 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam). 
7 While the Porters appealed other aspects of this decision, 
they declined to appeal the decision regarding recordation. 
Id.; see also City Br. at 9-10. Therefore, Commerce Bank’s 
previously recorded mortgage had first priority as to any 





property.8 The Porters also filed a declaratory judgment action 
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania claiming that Debra’s 
unrecorded mortgage on the property had priority over 
Commerce Bank’s subsequently recorded mortgage.9 The 
federal declaratory judgment action was pending at the time of 
the sheriff’s sale.10  
 
Porter also contacted the Sheriff’s Office directly 
several times before the sheriff’s sale in an effort to inform that 
office about his wife’s alleged interest in the property and the 
outstanding federal lawsuit.11 Porter planned to yet again assert 
his interest in the property at a hearing regarding the 
foreclosure in state court the day before the sheriff’s sale, but 
the judge cancelled the hearing and allowed the sale to 
proceed.12      
 
8 Id. at *2-3.  
9 Porter, 337 F. Supp. 3d at 536; App. 636-37.  
10 App. 636-37. After the sheriff’s sale, the District Court 
granted summary judgment to the defendant on preclusion 
grounds based on the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision 
declining to retroactively record Debra’s mortgage, and we 
affirmed in an unreported per curiam opinion. See Porter v. 
TD Bank N.A., 519 F. App’x 109, 110 (3d Cir. 2013). 
11 Porter, 337 F. Supp. 3d at 536 (“Porter had gone to the 
Sheriff’s office on several occasions, trying to prevent the 
sheriff’s sale of the property proceeding, and alternatively 
attempting to ensure that whoever bought the property at the 
sheriff’s sale was aware of the pending declaratory judgment 
action.”); App. 639. 
12 App. 637; Porter Br. at 5. In his brief, Porter claims that the 
foreclosure court cancelled this hearing “in reliance on the 
bank’s representation” that an announcement would be made 
at the sheriff’s sale. Porter Br. at 16. However, Porter 
provides no support for his contention that the court relied on 
the bank’s agreement to make an announcement when 
cancelling the hearing. In his trial testimony, Porter makes no 
mention of the reason for the sua sponte cancellation. App. 
638; see also App. 373-74 (discussing the cancelled hearing, 
Porter’s attorney makes no mention of the reason for the 
cancellation). Moreover, these assertions do not alter our 
analysis or conclusion. We mention them only to more fully 




Undeterred and determined to warn potential bidders 
about his wife’s alleged interest in the property, Porter sought 
Commerce Bank’s assurance that it would inform bidders at 
the sheriff’s sale about the pending lawsuit regarding the 
property.13 Accordingly, Porter’s attorney e-mailed Commerce 
Bank’s attorney to confirm that “the bank will make sure that 
the sheriff announces the existence of the federal court action 
at the sheriff’s sale to potential bidders.”14 Porter’s attorney 
also sent Porter an e-mail stating: 
 
Jim, I’m just confirming what I told you to do 
today if the bank does not announce [Debra’s] 
lawsuit at the sale. You are to say that Deb has 
filed a federal lawsuit claiming she has an 
unrecorded mortgage which would survive the 
sheriff’s sale.15 
 
Porter—accompanied by his wife, brother, and 
mother—attended the sheriff’s sale on January 4, 2011 to 
ensure potential bidders were warned about the potential 
lawsuit.16 Commerce Bank’s attorney never arrived at the 
sheriff’s sale. Thus, when the property came up for sale, Porter 
stood up and began reading his attorney’s email in an attempt 
to make the announcement himself.17 Shortly after Porter 
began speaking, Edward Chew, an attorney for the Sheriff’s 
Office, and Deputy Sheriff Daryll Stewart charged Porter and 
ordered him to stop speaking.18 Chew grabbed Porter by the 
arm and signaled for the deputies to assist. They then “pulled 
Porter by the collar, put Porter in a chokehold, placed him in 
handcuffs, hit him with a stun gun, and eventually dragged him 
from the room.”19 Porter and at least one deputy required 
medical attention as a result of the scuffle.20 Porter was arrested 
 
13 Porter, 337 F. Supp. 3d at 536; Porter Br. at 6. 
14 App. 362-63. 
15 Porter, 337 F. Supp. 3d at 536. 
16 Porter Br. at 6.  
17 Porter, 337 F. Supp. 3d at 536. 
18 Id. 





and later convicted of misdemeanor resisting arrest, although 
he was acquitted of all other charges.21 
 
II.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Porter sued the City of Philadelphia and various 
individuals in their official capacities in state court alleging 
that their conduct during the sheriff’s sale violated his First 
Amendment right to free speech. The defendants thereafter 
removed the suit to the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.22 There, Porter insisted on 
representing himself and proceeded pro se. The District Court 
closely supervised the case and conducted extensive pretrial 
proceedings to ensure Porter had a fair trial.23 Porter’s civil 
rights claims included a Monell claim against the City based 
upon its unwritten policy of not allowing any non-bidder to 
comment at sheriff’s sales.24  
 
At trial, the court instructed the jury that “Mr. Porter had 
a constitutionally-protected right to speak at the sheriff’s sale 
in order to make the announcement that had been discussed 
with [his] attorney. In other words, no person employed by the 
 
21 Id.; see also Porter Br. at 9.  
22 Porter, 337 F. Supp. 3d at 537. Porter’s mother, Marilyn 
Sankowski was a co-plaintiff and alleged that the Sheriff’s 
Office attorney, Edward Chew, used excessive force against 
her by grabbing her during the exchange. Id. at 539. 
Sankowski succeeded at trial against Chew and did not 
appeal. Id. at 543. 
23 Id. at 537. Indeed, the District Court is to be commended 
for the manner in which it conducted the rather involved 
pretrial hearings as well as the trial itself. 
24 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 
U.S. 658 (1978). The District Court initially ruled that Porter 
had waived this claim and dismissed it. However, after the 
City’s witnesses conceded that the City had an unwritten 
policy of not allowing comments at sheriff’s sales, the court 
reinstated that claim over the City’s objection and the claim 
was submitted to the jury. Inasmuch as we conclude that the 
City’s policy did not violate Porter’s First Amendment rights, 
we need not address the City’s argument that the court erred 




sheriff’s office, whether a law enforcement officer or not, had 
any right to interfere with their making such an 
announcement,” and that the sheriff’s policy against 
announcements “as applied to the plaintiff[] at the hearing, was 
in violation of [his] constitutional right to freedom of speech 
and to petition.”25 
 
The jury returned a verdict for Porter on the Monell 
claim and awarded him $750,000 in damages.26 The jury also 
awarded Porter $7,500 on his claim against Edward Chew for 
retaliating against Porter for the exercise of his First 
Amendment rights.27 The District Court denied the City’s 
motions for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, or 
remittitur. The court found that the policy banning comments 
during the sheriff’s sale was not a reasonable time, place, and 
manner restriction because Porter did not have ample 
alternatives to communicate his message, the ban was 
viewpoint discriminatory, and the policy was not narrowly 
tailored.28 The court ruled that remittitur was not warranted 
because the $750,000 award was neither a violation of due 
process nor “so grossly excessive as to shock the judicial 
conscience.”29 This appeal followed.  
 
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
We review the denial of judgment as a matter of law de 
novo.30 To the extent that the District Court’s denial is based 
on its application of the nonpublic public forum test to the facts 
of this case, we also review the decision de novo.31 We review 
 
25 App. 972-73. 
26 Porter, 337 F. Supp. 3d at 543. 
27 Id. However, the court granted Chew’s motion for 
judgment as a matter of law and Porter did not appeal that 
ruling. Thus, only the propriety of the verdict in favor of 
Porter on his Monell claim is before us. 
28 Id. at 552-53. 
29 Id. at 554 (quoting Cortez v. Trans Union, LLC, 617 F.3d 
688, 718 (3d Cir. 2010)).  
30 Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs. Inc., 561 F.3d 
199, 211 (3d. Cir. 2009).  
31 See Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 




the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party and enter judgment as a matter of law if, upon review of 
the record, “there is insufficient evidence from which a jury 
reasonably could find liability.”32  
 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
 
“Nothing in the Constitution requires the Government 
freely to grant access to all who wish to exercise their right to 
free speech on every type of Government property without 
regard to the nature of the property or to the disruption that 
might be caused by the speaker’s activities.”33 A city’s liability 
for an alleged First Amendment violation must be based upon 
a policy or custom of the city rather than upon the act of an 
individual city employee.34 Accordingly, when a First 
Amendment challenge is brought against a city, we must first 
determine what official city policy or custom is at issue for the 
purposes of § 1983, and then identify and apply the correct 
First Amendment principles to that policy based on the nature 
and use of the government owned or controlled forum where 
the speech occurred.  
 
A. Characteristics of Philadelphia’s Sheriff’s Sales 
 
A mortgage foreclosure sheriff’s sale is a court-ordered 
public auction of foreclosed properties organized by the 
government.35 A mortgage holder can initiate a foreclosure 
 
a motion for a new trial[,] . . .  if the court’s denial of the 
motion is based on application of a legal precept, our review 
is plenary . . . .”). 
32 Mancini, 836 F.3d at 314 (quoting Lightning Lube, Inc. v. 
Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
33 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 
U.S. 788, 799-800 (1985). 
34 Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. 
35 Porter, 337 F. Supp. 3d at 547 (describing the sheriff’s sale 
as “a public auction of real property, carried out by a 
governmental entity, pursuant to a state statute providing for 
orderly and public opportunity to acquire properties that have 
been foreclosed upon for failure to pay outstanding 
mortgages.”); Philadelphia Sheriff’s Dep’t, Everything You 




action against a property owner who has defaulted on a 
mortgage and obtain a judgment in foreclosure.36 The 
mortgage holder can then obtain and file a writ of execution 
directing the sheriff to sell the property at a public auction.37 It 
is the sheriff’s duty to conduct sheriff’s sales and set policies 
and procedures for these auctions.38 In Philadelphia, sheriff’s 
sales take place once a month in a room about four times the 
size of a typical courtroom.39 Maintaining an orderly 
environment is necessary to efficiently sell hundreds of 
properties and avoid chaos.40 Because hundreds of foreclosed 
properties are sold at each auction, the auction is conducted 
with the decorum of a courtroom.41 In an effort to maintain 
such an environment, the sheriff has adopted an unwritten 
policy barring comments or announcements from non-
 
https://www.officeofphiladelphiasheriff.com/en/real-
estate/how-sheriffs-sales-work (last visited Sept. 3, 2020). 
36 App. 965-66. 
37 Id. at 966-67; see also App. 504 (explaining that the 
Sheriff’s Office is “acting [as] the court’s arm selling . . . 
property” at a sheriff’s sale).  
38 See, e.g., App. 966; City Br. at 8-9; App. 384 (describing 
the duty of the sheriff to “[m]ake sure the sheriff’s sale[s] run 
accordingly.”); see also Pa. R.C.P. 3129.1, 3129.2, 3129,3, 
and 3135 (describing the procedures of and the sheriff’s 
duties regarding sheriff’s sales); 68 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 2310 (West) (providing for a commission to be paid to 
the sheriff for the service of conducting mortgage 
foreclosures sales); 42 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 21104(b)-(c) (same); 
43 Pennsylvania Law Encyclopedia, Sheriffs and Constables 
§ 89 (2019) (“It is the duty of a sheriff to make a sale of a 
judgment debtor’s property in accordance with the court’s 
writ.”). 
39 City Br. at 8. 
  
40 App. 504; City Br. at 8. 




bidding42 members of the public during the sale.43 A property 
owner, or his or her attorney, may present a court order or 
bankruptcy petition to stop or postpone the sale when a 
property comes up for auction, but all other comments are 
prohibited.44  
 
B. Monell Claims under § 1983 
Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s holding in Monell, a 
city is only liable under § 1983 for constitutional violations that 
are caused by its official policies and customs.45  “[A] 
municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a 
 
42 To the extent that a bid and directly related speech (i.e. 
offering a price) can be construed as a public announcement, 
naturally this is allowed. That is how we understand the 
City’s references in its brief, see City Br. at 8, 19, 24, to the 
policy prohibiting “non-bidders” from speaking. See also City 
Br. at 19 (“[I]t is inherently reasonable to preclude all non-bid 
comments during an auction . . .”). Nowhere does the City 
argue, nor do we imply, that the ban on public 
announcements allows bidders to make public 
announcements unrelated to bids. 
43 The District Court concluded that “the uncontroverted 
evidence [is] clear that the Sheriff’s Office had a policy of 
forbidding announcements at sales.” Porter, 337 F. Supp. 3d 
at 548. This is consistent with the testimony of several 
witnesses from both Porter and the City, including Sheriff 
Barbara Deeley. Id. at 547 (“The defendant Sheriff at trial 
admitted . . . the existence of a policy forbidding 
announcements at Sheriff’s sales.”); see also id. at 539-40; 
App. 390; App. 504-05.  
44 City Br. at 8-9.  
45 Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 (“Local governing bodies . . . can 
be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or 
injunctive relief where . . .  the action that is alleged to be 
unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, 
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and 
promulgated by that body’s officers.”); see also Baloga v. 
Pittston Area Sch. Dist., 927 F.3d 742, 761 (3d Cir. 2019) 
(explaining that a municipality is only liable for a policy or 





tortfeasor . . .  in other words, a municipality cannot be held 
liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”46 A 
policy need not be passed by a legislative body, or even be in 
writing, to constitute an official policy for the purposes of § 
1983. A pertinent decision by an official with decision-making 
authority on the subject constitutes official policy.47 Therefore, 
we must first determine whether the conduct that gave rise to 
Porter’s First Amendment claim was pursuant to an official 
policy or custom. If it was, that conduct could support Porter’s 
Monell claim. In contrast, if the conduct was simply that of an 
individual employee who was not acting pursuant to a policy 
or custom, that conduct cannot give rise to municipal liability 
under Monell.  
 
As the District Court explained, there is uncontroverted 
evidence from multiple witnesses, including Sheriff Deeley, 
that the City had an unwritten policy prohibiting comments 
during sheriff’s sales.48 Sheriff Deeley testified that she had a 
duty to “[m]ake sure the sheriff’s sale[s] run accordingly”49 
and the District Court instructed the jury that “[o]ne of the 
duties of the Sheriff is to conduct sheriff’s sales.”50 Likewise, 
the District Court instructed the jury that “[t]he policy or 
custom at issue here, as testified by representatives of the 
sheriff’s office, is not to allow announcements or statements at 
a sheriff’s sale,”51 and furthermore that there was not “any 
dispute” that “[t]he Sheriff’s Office had the policy not to allow 
 
46 Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.  
47 Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84 
(1986) (“Municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where . . . 
a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from 
among various alternatives by the official or officials 
responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the 
subject matter in question.”).  
48 Porter, 337 F. Supp. 3d at 548. 
49 App. 384. 
50 App. 966; see also Pa. R.C.P. 3145 (describing the sheriff’s 
legal duties regarding sheriff’s sales); App. 504 (explaining 
that the Sheriff’s Office is “acting [as] the court’s arm selling 
. . . property” at a sheriff’s sale).  




announcements at sheriff’s sales.52 We therefore conclude that 
the City’s policy of precluding public announcements at 
sheriff’s sales was an official policy of the City for purposes of 
§ 1983 liability under Monell. 
 
Given Porter’s allegation that policy was subjectively 
and inconsistently enforced, it may have been preferable to 
submit the existence, nature, and reasonableness of the policy 
to the jury.53 Nevertheless, the District Court removed any 
possibility that the jury would consider this issue when it 
instructed the jury that the sheriff’s office had a policy against 
announcements that was unconstitutional as applied to the 
plaintiffs.54 The jury was therefore not called upon to 
determine the contours of the City’s policy or its 
reasonableness. We review the District Court’s conclusion 
regarding the existence and nature of the policy de novo. We 
credit its ruling that the policy prohibiting public comments 
existed, but we disagree with the analysis the followed from 
that finding. 
 
The District Court held that the City’s policy violated 
Porter’s First Amendment right to free speech. In doing so, it 
 
52 App. 1013 (“You heard testimony about the policy. I don’t 
think there’s any dispute about it. The Sheriff’s Office had the 
policy not to allow announcements at sheriff’s sales.”). 
53 See App. 6-9 (Verdict Sheet). 
54 See App. 972-73 (“You have heard testimony that the 
sheriff’s office had a policy against announcements. I instruct 
you that this policy, as applied to the plaintiffs at the hearing, 
was in violation of their constitutional right to freedom of 
speech and to petition. Plaintiff’s [sic] attempt to speak was in 
furtherance of their constitutional right to speak and to 
petition.”); see also App. 981 (“I instruct you that the 
Sheriff’s policy was violative of the First Amendment if you 
find it was relied on by Defendants Chew and Stewart or the 
employees of the sheriff’s office to cause Porter to be 
interrupted and seized as he was speaking.”); App. 1013 
(“The Sheriff’s Office had the policy not to allow 
announcements at sheriff’s sales . . . if you find that that 
policy was applied as to Mr. Porter, that was a violation of his 





relied upon Chew’s testimony that he did not allow 
announcements that could depreciate the value of an auctioned 
property in concluding that the policy discriminated based on 
viewpoint.55 The District Court also concluded that a 
“plausible nexus or affirmative link” between the City’s policy 
prohibiting announcements during the sheriff’s sale and 
Chew’s “brutal implementation [of the policy] through 
physical force” is sufficient to hold the City liable under 
Monell.56 Similarly, Porter acknowledges that “the evidence 
established that the City had a policy of not allowing 
announcements at sheriff’s sales,” but maintains that Chew 
“inconsistently enforced it based on what the speaker wanted 
to say.”57  
 
However, Porter has not shown that Chew was a 
policymaker.58 To the extent the District Court suggests that 
the City is liable for Chew’s individual decision-making, we 
cannot agree. His unendorsed actions, without more, did not 
become municipal policy or give rise to municipal liability 
under Monell. There is no evidence to suggest that municipal 
decision-makers were aware of Chew’s inconsistent 
implementation of the no-comment policy or that Chew had 
previously used force to enforce it with the tacit approval of 
policymakers.59 To the contrary, trial testimony indicates that 
the Sheriff’s Office’s policy was to ask people who tried to 
make announcements to sit down and, if they did not comply, 
 
55 Porter, 337 F. Supp. 3d at 552-53.  
56 Porter, 337 F. Supp. 3d at 553. 
57 Porter Br. at 11.  
58 Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 264-65 (3d Cir. 
2010) (rejecting a § 1983 plaintiff’s Monell claim where 
plaintiff “presented no evidence that [the chief of police] was 
a final policymaker for the Borough” whose actions or 
decisions subjected the City to liability).  
59 See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 130 
(1988) (“[T]he mere failure to investigate the basis of a 
subordinate’s discretionary decisions does not amount to a 
delegation of policymaking authority, especially where . . . 
the wrongfulness of the subordinate’s decision arises from a 




to escort them out of the hall.60 Furthermore, one Sheriff’s 
Office clerk testified that the violent response was something 
he “[had] never [seen] . . . before” at a sheriff’s sale and agreed 
that it was “out of character of the normal conduct of 
business.”61 While the District Court found that the deputies 
approached Porter “at the request of Chew”62 and that “Chew 
apparently asked for such a response,”63 the fact that Chew 
apparently had the authority to direct the deputies to stop Porter 
from speaking does not make his decision to do so City policy. 
“The fact that a particular official . . . has discretion in the 
exercise of particular functions does not, without more, give 
rise to municipal liability based on an exercise of that 
discretion.” 64 Rather, “[t]he official must also be responsible 
for establishing final government policy respecting such 
activity before the municipality can be held liable.”65 Thus, we 
cannot conclude that Chew’s unofficial determination of how 
and when the policy was to be enforced, in contravention of the 
City’s clear and nondiscriminatory policy prohibiting all 
comments, gives rise to liability under Monell.  
 
60 App. 336 (testifying about his experience witnessing over 
600 sheriff’s sales, Sheriff’s Office clerk Richard Tyer 
explained that people who attempt to make announcements 
are “told to sit down,” and “if they don’t comply, then they’ll 
be escorted out.”); see also App. 466 (Sheriff’s Office clerk 
Michael Riverso testifying that individuals making 
announcements are told to sit down); App. 552-53 (Witness 
Daryll Stewart explaining that procedure when someone 
stands up to make an announcement is to “ask them to step to 
the side” and then deal with the person’s issue individually).  
61 App. 468.  
62 Porter, 337 F. Supp. 3d at 552. 
63 Id. at 553. 
64 Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481-83 (internal citation omitted). 
65 Id.; see also Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 129 (finding that even 
decisions by supervisory employees that are not reviewed by 
any higher official are not necessarily official city policy for 
purposes of § 1983 if the employee does not have 
policymaking authority); Kelly, 622 F.3d at 265 (holding that 
a city is not liable for a police officer’s decision to arrest the 
plaintiff in a § 1983 suit because the decision was not 




C.  First Amendment Forum Analysis  
Having identified the City’s policy for the purposes of 
§ 1983 liability, we next must determine the First Amendment 
principles applicable to speech at a mortgage foreclosure 
sheriff’s sale. Because Porter’s speech is not obscene, geared 
towards the incitement of violence, or libelous, it is undeniably 
protected by the First Amendment.66 Accordingly, we can 
proceed directly to a discussion of the forum to determine the 
extent to which the City could limit Porter’s right to free speech 
during a sheriff’s sale. When it comes to First Amendment free 
speech challenges, “not every public property is the same, and 
different types of property will require different treatment.”67 
There are three types of protected forums for speech occurring 
on government owned or controlled property.68 The type of 
forum in which the relevant speech takes place “determines the 
contours of the First Amendment rights that a court recognizes 
when reviewing the challenged governmental action.”69  
 
Traditional public forums are places that the 
government has historically held out for speech and assembly, 
such as public streets and parks.70 Traditional public forums 
are entitled to the greatest protection of speech. Accordingly, 
any content-based restrictions will receive strict scrutiny.71 
 
66 See Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 282-83 
(3d Cir. 2004) (“[E]xcept for certain narrow categories 
deemed unworthy of full First Amendment protection—such 
as obscenity, ‘fighting words’ and libel—all speech is 
protected by the First Amendment.”).  
67 NAACP v. City of Phila., 834 F.3d 435, 441 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(explaining that “the Supreme Court has grouped public 
properties along a spectrum” where First Amendment 
protections are determined based on the nature and use of the 
public property). 
68 Id.  
69 Galena v. Leone, 638 F.3d 186, 197 (3d Cir. 2011); see 
also See United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 274 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (“The degree of First Amendment protection a 
speaker enjoys depends on the type of forum in which his 
expressive activity occurred.”).  
70 NAACP, 834 F.3d at 441.  




While the government may impose reasonable time, place, and 
manner restrictions on speech, viewpoint-based restrictions are 
prohibited.72 Designated public forums are properties that have 
“not traditionally been regarded as a public forum [but are] 
intentionally opened up for that purpose.”73 When the 
government opens a forum for speech-related activity, the 
same standards apply as in a traditional public forum.74 Finally, 
a nonpublic forum (or limited public forum) is a public 
property that has “not, as a matter of tradition or designation, 
been used for purposes of assembly and communication.”75 
 
72 Minn. Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1885 
(2018). 
73 Id. (quoting Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 
U.S. 460, 469 (2009)). 
74 Id.  
75 Id. The “nonpublic forum” has also sometimes been 
referred to as the “limited public forum,” creating confusion 
about whether there is a difference between these two 
classifications. As we explained in NAACP, the Supreme 
Court recently has used the terms “limited public forum” and 
“nonpublic forum” interchangeably, suggesting that, if there 
is a distinction, these two categories are afforded the same 
treatment. Id. at 441 n.2; see also Galena, 638 F.3d at 197 n.8 
(acknowledging the inconsistency among federal court and 
Supreme Court opinions on whether “limited public forum” 
and “nonpublic forum” are separate and distinct categories, 
but suggesting the Supreme Court has recently used the terms 
interchangeably). We will follow the Supreme Court’s most 
recent application of the forum analysis in Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 
at 1885. There, the Supreme Court identified the three forums 
as traditional public forum, designated public forum, and 
nonpublic forum and applied the definition and legal test to 
the “nonpublic forum” that this Court has applied to the 
“limited public forum.” Id. We need not resolve today the 
lingering doubt about the distinction between a “nonpublic” 
and “limited public” forum. The parties here agree that the 
sheriff’s sale is a “limited public forum,” which, for our 
purposes, we find synonymous with the nonpublic forum. We 
will therefore apply the principles of the nonpublic forum, as 




Rather, it is “a forum that is limited to use by certain groups or 
dedicated solely to the discussion of certain subjects.”76  
 
A nonpublic forum is entitled to lesser First 
Amendment protection than the other two forums. 
Accordingly, the government is allowed “much more 
flexibility to craft rules limiting speech.”77 “The government 
may reserve such a forum ‘for its intended purposes, 
communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on 
speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression 
merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.’”78 
Content-based restrictions on speech are valid so long as they 
are reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum and 
viewpoint neutral.79  
 
The parties conceded that the sheriff’s sale is a limited 
public forum, and the District Court agreed.80 To the extent that 
the District Court adopted the definition and legal test 
applicable to the “nonpublic forum” as outlined by the 
Supreme Court in Mansky, we agree and find the two terms 
interchangeable for the purpose of a First Amendment forum 
analysis here. However, to the extent that the District Court 
applied the test for a “time, place, and manner” restriction to 
the City’s no announcement policy, we will reverse course. 
The Supreme Court in Mansky made a distinction between 
traditional and designated public forums, where restrictions on 
the time, place, and manner of speech are subject to certain 
 
76 Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 470. 
77 Mansky, 138 S. Ct. at 1885.  
78 Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educators’ 
Ass’n., 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)). 
79 NAACP, 834 F.3d at 441.  
80 Porter, 337 F. Supp. 3d at 547. The City briefly questions 
whether a forum analysis applies to the sheriff’s sale as a 
“Court-like proceeding,” but agrees that if a forum analysis 
applies that the auction is a limited public forum. City Br. at 
22-23, n.5.  Although the auction apparently maintains the 
decorum of a courtroom and is described as similar to a court 
proceeding, it is not a formal judicial proceeding, and we 





limitations,81 and the nonpublic forum, where “on the other 
hand . . . the government has much more flexibility to craft 
rules limiting speech.”82 The Supreme Court discussed the 
government’s right to “impose reasonable time, place, and 
manner restrictions on private speech,” subject to certain 
restrictions, only in reference to the traditional and designated 
public forums.83 This is consistent with the Court’s explanation 
that the nonpublic forum is subject to “a distinct standard of 
review . . . because the government, ‘no less than a private 
owner of property,’ retains the ‘power to preserve the property 
under its control for the use to which it is lawfully 
dedicated.’”84 We therefore decline to apply the three-part test 
appliable to time, place, and manner restrictions to the 
nonpublic forum at issue here. 
 
Moreover, the District Court stated that the Sheriff’s 
Office “has no right to forbid an individual with an interest in 
the property making a short statement as to the individual’s 
interest in the property being offered for sale.”85 We disagree. 
As the government entity charged with conducting sheriff’s 
sales, the Sheriff’s Office has the right to limit speech in 
accordance with the First Amendment principles applicable to 
nonpublic forums.86 During the sheriff’s sale, the space utilized 
 
81 A time, place, and manner restriction is reasonable if it: 1) 
is content-neutral; 2) is narrowly tailored to serve an 
important government interest; and 3) leaves open ample 
alternatives for communication of the information. Galena, 
638 F.3d at 199.  
82 Mansky, 138 S. Ct. at 1885 (citations omitted). 
83 Id.  
84 Id. (quoting Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966)). 
85 Porter, 337 F. Supp. 3d at 547.  
86 Similarly, although the District Court introduced the 
concept of a forum analysis to the jury at trial, it essentially 
removed any possibility of the jury’s assessing the 
constitutionality of the City’s policy in a limited or nonpublic 
forum when it instructed the jury that “Mr. Porter had a 
constitutionally-protected right to speak at the sheriff’s sale in 
order to make the announcement that had been discussed with 
their attorney,” App. 972, and that “the sheriff’s office had a 
policy against announcements,” which, “as applied to the 




is limited to use by the Sheriff’s Office for the exclusive 
purpose of holding a public auction of foreclosed properties. 
Because the sheriff’s sale is a nonpublic forum, the Sheriff’s 
Office policy prohibiting comments during the auction is valid 
so long as it is viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the 
City’s right “‘to preserve the property under its control for the 
use to which it is lawfully dedicated[:]’” conducting a public 
auction of foreclosed properties.87  
 
D. First Amendment Analysis of the Sheriff’s Office’s 
No Comment Policy 
We conclude that the Sheriff’s Office’s policy 
prohibiting comments during the sheriff’s sale is a reasonable, 
viewpoint neutral speech restriction aimed at protecting the 
Sheriff’s Office’s ability to sell hundreds of foreclosed 
properties in a single auction.88 Moreover, any abuse of 
discretion by Chew in enforcing a clear and non-discriminatory 
policy prohibiting all comments does not alone give rise to 
municipal liability.  
1. Reasonableness 
We hold that the policy forbidding public comments 
during sheriff’s sale auctions is a reasonable speech restriction 
that serves the purpose of the sheriff’s sale: the orderly 
disposition of hundreds of properties in a single auction. 
Because this is a nonpublic forum, the government is not 
required to adopt the least restrictive policy nor show that the 
policy is narrowly tailored to protect a compelling 
 
constitutional right to freedom of speech and to petition,” 
App. 973. The City contends that this directed the jury’s 
verdict. We agree. 
87 Id.  
88 Our discussion here is focused on the mortgage foreclosure 
sheriff’s sale and the unique circumstances and requirements 
of such a forum. The specific analysis does not necessarily 
apply to other types of nonpublic forums. This is particularly 
true of our discussion of reasonableness. Any analysis of 
reasonableness must focus on the needs of the speaker to 
communicate a given message as well as the needs of the 




government’s interest.89 Rather, the government need only 
“draw a reasonable line” and “be able to articulate some 
sensible basis for distinguishing what may come in from what 
must stay out.”90  
 
During an auction—described as a court-like 
proceeding—all speech by non-bidders is inherently 
disruptive.91 An auction requires a clear and direct line of 
communication between bidders and the auctioneer in order to 
complete each sale, especially in a room with hundreds of 
people. “[T]he interruption of the order of business is itself the 
disturbance” that the City’s policy seeks to avoid.92 Allowing 
public comments during the sheriff’s sale would threaten the 
Sheriff’s Office’s ability to conduct an auction, a proceeding 
specifically provided for under Pennsylvania law.93 As the City 
explains, “public comment or discussion of a property would 
undoubtedly bog down a sale and cause chaos.”94 The Sheriff’s 
Office therefore prohibits public announcements and further 
requires an interested person to obtain a court order or present 
a bankruptcy petition in order to stop a sale.95 The requirement 
 
89 NAACP, 834 F.3d at 441.  
90 Mansky, 138 S. Ct. at 1888; see also NAACP, 834 F.3d at 
441 (“[T]he Government’s decision to restrict access . . . need 
only be reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the 
only reasonable limitation”) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
91 App. 390-91 (explaining that the sheriff’s sale maintains 
the decorum of a court proceeding).  
92 Galena, 638 F.3d at 212.  
93 See Mansky, 138 S. Ct. at 1885 (“[T]he government . . . 
retains the power to preserve the property under its control for 
the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.”) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  
94 City Br. at 27-28 n.7; see also App. 504-05 (according to 
Chew’s testimony: “Can you imagine if everyone . . .  stood 
up and made an announcement for every one of those 
properties? It would be chaos.”). 
95 Although enforcing the order (and thereby stopping the 
sale) will generally signal to the public that the property is no 
longer for sale, this does not convert the order into a public 
comment or announcement. Even if we were to construe this 




that a property owner take advantage of the available court 
processes to obtain an order or petition staying or postponing 
the sale, rather than make unsubstantiated public claims about 
his or her interest in a property, is a “sensible basis for 
distinguishing what may come in from what must stay out.” 
Therefore, the City’s policy prohibiting public comments 
during the auction, in the absence of a court order or 
bankruptcy petition, is a reasonable way to promote the 
efficient sale of properties by auction. Porter attempted to 
obtain such an order—several times—and failed.96 The City’s 
reasonable policy therefore applied to Porter. 
 
The City’s policy prohibiting all public announcements 
is distinguishable from the state statute the Supreme Court 
found unconstitutional in Mansky.97 There, Minnesota banned 
voters from wearing any political badges, political buttons, or 
political insignia inside a polling place on election day.98 The 
ban applied to any item “promoting a group with recognizable 
political views.”99 The Supreme Court found that this law 
violated the First Amendment right to free speech because it 
left the word “political” undefined and thereby granted 
unfettered discretion to election judges to determine what was 
prohibited.100 In the Court’s view, the “unmoored use of the 
term ‘political’ in the Minnesota law” left election officials 
without “objective, workable standards” to guide their 
discretion.101 “A rule whose fair enforcement requires an 
election judge to maintain a mental index of the platforms and 
 
order or bankruptcy petition may announce that the property 
is no longer for sale), such restrictions are allowed in a 
nonpublic forum. NAACP, 834 F.3d at 441 (explaining that, 
in a nonpublic forum, “[c]ontent-based restrictions are valid 
so long as they are reasonable and viewpoint neutral.”). 
Because the court had denied Porter’s repeated motions to 
stay or postpone the sale, Porter—as well as his attorney and 
Commerce Bank’s attorney (had they been present)—was 
bound by the policy prohibiting public announcements.  
96 City Br. at 27.  
97 138 S. Ct. 1876.  
98 Id. at 1882. 
99 Id. at 1890. 
100 Id. at 1888. 




positions of every candidate and party on the ballot is not 
reasonable.”102 Because the “indeterminate prohibition” was 
not “capable of reasoned application,” the restriction “fail[ed] 
even [the] forgiving test” for reasonableness in a nonpublic 
forum.103 
 
Here, in contrast, there is no issue of an indeterminacy: 
all public announcements are prohibited. Unlike Minnesota’s 
law that required election judges across the state to individually 
interpret and apply their own definition of “political,” the 
City’s policy does not require the Sheriff’s Office to interpret 
the content of the speaker’s message in order to determine if it 
is allowed. Instead, the policy requires the Sheriff’s Office to 
stop anyone who attempts to make an announcement to the 
general public regarding the properties (or anything else for 
that matter). The only discretion involved is determining 
whether the person has a valid court order or bankruptcy 
petition staying or postponing the sale, which is not the type of 
determination that carries the “opportunity for abuse” or 
creates a subjective, unworkable standard.104 The City’s no 
comment policy is therefore “capable of reasoned 
application.”105  
 
Porter alleges that Chew inconsistently enforced the 
City’s policy, but as we address below, Chew’s purportedly 
selective enforcement does not go towards the reasonableness 
of the policy itself. Given the City’s “flexibility” to craft 
reasonable limitations on speech that reserve the sheriff’s sale 
for the intended purpose of conducting a public auction, the 
City’s policy meets “this forgiving test.”106 
2.  Viewpoint Neutrality 
Next, we disagree with the District Court’s finding that 
the City’s policy prohibiting public comments during the 
 
102 Id. at 1889. 
103 Id. at 1888, 1891-92.  
104 Mansky, 138 S. Ct. at 1891. In fact, this is not a 
discretionary decision at all. If a court has ordered the sale of 
the property to be stayed or postponed, the Sheriff’s Office 
must comply. 
105 Id. at 1892. 




sheriff’s sale discriminated based on viewpoint.107 The District 
Court reached its conclusion based on “testimony that the 
organizers of the sheriff’s sale tolerated announcements, 
suggesting that Chew’s implementation of the policy was 
viewpoint-discriminatory.”108 Chew testified that whether he 
allowed an announcement “depends on what [the speaker] 
wanted to say” and that he was concerned with announcements 
that “have a chilling effect on the sale itself.”109 The District 
Court concluded that “Chew thus essentially conceded that the 
policy, or at least his application of it, was not content-neutral, 
and discriminated on the basis of . . . viewpoint.”110  
 
This District Court’s conclusion fails on two levels. 
First, as explained above, Porter cannot establish municipal 
liability under Monell absent a policy or custom that violates a 
person’s constitutional rights. The City’s policy in this case is 
clear and uncontested: no comments are allowed.111 That 
 
107 Porter, 337 F. Supp. 3d at 552-53.  
108 Id. at 552 (emphasis added). 
109 App. 500. Chew testified that he did not allow 
announcements that may interfere with a sale or decrease the 
sale price. According to the City, this is not viewpoint 
discriminatory since value-decreasing speech is not a 
“viewpoint.” City Br. at 33-34; see also Oral Arg. Transcript 
at 7, 12 (arguing that viewpoint discrimination refers to 
targeting certain opinions or ideologies, whereas prohibiting 
speech that discourages sales is an eminently reasonable 
content-based distinction at an auction). Because we find that 
the City’s official policy prohibited all announcements, 
regardless of content or viewpoint, we need not delve into the 
analytical distinction between content and viewpoint 
discrimination. 
110 Porter, 337 F. Supp. 3d at 553 (emphasis added). 
111 The District Court rightly found that “[n]umerous 
witnesses for both Porter and [the City] confirmed the 
existence of a policy ostensibly forbidding announcements at 
sheriff’s sales.” Id. at 552. In discussing the requirements 
under Monell, the District Court also found “that the Sheriff’s 
Department had a specific ‘policy’ not to allow any 
‘announcements’ to be made at Sheriff’s sale” and “the 
Defendant Sheriff at trial admitted . . . the existence of a 




prohibition applies to all comments, regardless of the 
viewpoint that is expressed. Consequently, there is no apparent 
viewpoint discrimination. 
 
Second, the discussion of how Chew implemented or 
applied the City’s policy prohibiting announcements conflates 
a facial constitutional challenge regarding the City’s policy 
with an as-applied constitutional challenge regarding the 
enforcement of the policy against Porter.112 As we have 
explained, the City’s policy prohibiting comments is 
reasonable and viewpoint neutral on its face, prohibiting all 
public announcements regardless of the speaker or message. 
Any facial challenge to the City’s policy therefore fails. To the 
extent we can construe Porter’s challenge as an as-applied 
challenge based on the selective enforcement of the City’s 
policy, this also fails. 113 While Porter may bring an as-applied 
challenge to a facially constitutional policy, such a challenge 
remains subject to the constraints of Monell.  
 
In Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, a woman alleged that a 
facially valid ordinance creating a protest-free buffer-zone 
around abortion clinics was unconstitutional as applied to her 
because the Pittsburgh police were selectively enforcing it 
against her for expressing her pro-life views.114 In addressing 
her Monell claim, we explained that: “to establish municipal 
 
547. The jury was likewise instructed that the City had a 
policy forbidding comments. See supra, notes 51 and 52 and 
accompanying text. 
112 City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2451 (2015) 
(“Under the most exacting standard the Court has prescribed 
for facial challenges, a plaintiff must establish that a law is 
unconstitutional in all of its applications.”) (internal citations 
omitted); Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican 
Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008) (noting that “[f]acial 
challenges are disfavored”). 
113 See Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 325 
(2002) (explaining that a facially constitutional licensing 
scheme could be unconstitutional as-applied if the licensing 
agency engaged in a “pattern of unlawful favoritism,” such as 
“[g]ranting waivers to favored speakers (or, more precisely, 
denying them to disfavored speakers)”). 




liability for selective enforcement of a facially viewpoint-and 
content-neutral regulation, a plaintiff whose evidence consists 
solely of the incidents of enforcement . . . must establish a 
pattern of enforcement activity evincing a governmental policy 
or custom of intentional discrimination on the basis of 
viewpoint or content.”115 “[O]ne enforcement incident cannot 
meet the burden of proof imposed by Monell.”116 We further 
clarified that a plaintiff “must prove not merely that the weight 
of . . . the Ordinance has tended to fall more heavily on those 
who advocate one viewpoint (e.g., a pro-life view) than on 
those who advocate another (e.g., a pro-choice view)[,]” but 
also that “such enforcement occurred because of the viewpoint 
expressed.”117 In other words, a plaintiff must “show an intent 
to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint” by those enforcing 
the statute.118 The plaintiff in Brown failed to establish any 
such “pattern of unlawful favoritism” based on the two times 
that the police enforced the ordinance against her.119 
 
Neither has Porter proved a pattern of unlawful 
viewpoint discrimination. Even assuming arguendo that the 
Sheriff’s Office targeted Porter because of his viewpoint or his 
previous interactions with the Office on this one occasion, 
according to Brown the City is only liable where it evinces a 
pattern of intentional viewpoint discrimination. Porter falls 
short of this exacting standard.120 The limited and vague 
testimony regarding instances where the Sheriff’s Office 
permitted announcements is insufficient evidence to 
demonstrate a long-standing practice or custom of intentionally 
discriminating based on viewpoint.121 Unlike the plaintiff in 
 
115 Id. at 294. 
116 Id. at 296.  
117 Id. at 293 (emphasis in the original). 
118 Id.  
119 Id. at 294-95 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
120 As the District Court correctly notes, “[t]he requirements 
of a Monell claim . . . are very demanding.” Porter, 337 F. 
Supp. 3d at 546. 
121 Jett v. Dallas Ind. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989) 
(explaining that a municipality is liable for “acquiescence in a 
longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the 




Brown, who could identify a particular political or ideological 
viewpoint she claimed the city was targeting (pro-life 
protestors), Porter does not explain what viewpoint the 
Sheriff’s Office was favoring or disfavoring on a consistent 
basis. Nor does he demonstrate that the supposed inconsistency 
in the policy’s enforcement was backed by an intent to promote 
or suppress any particular views.122  
 
As we have explained, only Porter’s claim of municipal 
liability under Monell is before us. Because the City is not 
strictly liable for the actions of its individual employees, we 
need not decide whether Chew violated Porter’s constitutional 
rights by targeting Porter because of his message.123 We do not, 
of course, condone the manner in which Chew attempted to 
enforce the City’s policy.124 Nevertheless, the City cannot be 
 
entity”) (quotation omitted); see also Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of 
Bryan Cty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (“[A]n 
act performed pursuant to a ‘custom’ that has not been 
formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker may 
fairly subject a municipality to liability on the theory that the 
relevant practice is so widespread as to have the force of 
law.”); Baloga, 927 F.3d at 761 (explaining that municipal 
liability stems only from “a custom . . . though not authorized 
by law, [that] was so permanent and well settled as to 
virtually constitute law”) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
122 Brown, 586 F.3d at 293-94 (explaining that a 
disproportionate effect on speakers of a certain viewpoint, 
because “advocates of a particular viewpoint happen to 
engage in certain proscribed conduct more than those who 
espouse other views,” does not violate the First Amendment 
unless the plaintiff proves a discriminatory intent).  
123 As aforementioned, the jury found that Chew retaliated 
against Porter for exercising his First Amendment right to 
free speech, but also found that Chew did not cause Porter’s 
injuries. App. 6-7. Porter did not appeal that decision. We 
therefore consider only the claim against the City in this 
appeal.  
124 Because the claim against Chew is not before us, we take 
no position on whether Chew intended for the deputies to use 
excessive force against Porter, but merely refer to the District 




held liable under Monell based upon Chew’s actions without 
more than appears in this record.  
 
 “[T]he First Amendment simply does not require that 
all members of the public be permitted to voice objections . . .  
any time they desire to do so.”125 The City has entrusted the 
Sheriff’s Office with establishing a process to facilitate valid 
foreclosure judgments against property owners. In turn, the 
Sheriff’s Office has elected to sell properties with defaulted 
mortgages by auction at the sheriff’s sale. Efficiently disposing 
of hundreds of properties via live auction would be 
ineffective—if not impossible—absent rules limiting the order 
and manner of speaking. Allowing public announcements by 
every attendee, involving every lot, would be inherently 
disruptive to an orderly auction. The City’s policy prohibiting 
public announcements during the sheriff’s sale is a reasonable, 
viewpoint neutral restriction on speech designed to promote 
the efficient sale of hundreds of foreclosed properties in a 
single auction. Porter’s right to free speech does not encompass 
the right to disrupt the auction or hinder the intended purpose 
for which the government has reserved the nonpublic forum.126 
Because we find that Porter fails to state a claim under the First 
Amendment as a matter of law and therefore reverse the 
District Court’s denial of the City’s motion for judgment as a 
 
deputies to stop Porter from speaking. Porter, 337 F. Supp. 
3d at 553 (“Chew apparently asked for such a response.”).   
125 Galena, 638 F.3d at 212. 
126 See Mansky, 138 S. Ct. at 1885 (“The government may 
reserve such a forum ‘for its intended purposes, 
communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on 
speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression 
merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.’”) 
(quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 46); Startzell v. City of Phila., 533 
F.3d 183, 198 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The right of free speech does 
not encompass the right to cause disruption.”); see also 
Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 281 (ejecting a citizen from city 
council meeting for disruptive, off-topic speech is not a First 
Amendment violation because allowing “a speaker to try to 
hijack the proceedings, or to filibuster them, would impinge 





matter of law, we need not reach the issue of the City’s motion 
for new trial.  
 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 
Because there is an insufficient basis for a reasonable 
jury to find that the City of Philadelphia’s policy violated the 
First Amendment, we will reverse the District Court’s denial 
of the City’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and 
dismiss the First Amendment claim against the City.127  
 
127 Judge Porter concurs in the judgment. 
